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Concurrent with what appears to be a trans-European and even global trend, in Belgium, 
gender-specific topics have recently come to the attention of the media or in politics within 
the context of debates on multicultural society and integration of new immigrants and 
minorities. In our former paper, we have pointed to analyses of the complexity of the Belgian 
federal state and the many dimensions of Belgian diversity in which gender diversity seems to 
be relatively absent or is given a place at the margin of the so-called ‘problem of 
diversity/unity’. In this paper we shall provide an overview of the relationship between gender 
equality and cultural diversity by delineating at which levels and pertaining to which issues of 
public interest and policy domains this tenuous relationship has been articulated in Belgium.  
The federal context does not allow for a univocal and comparative picture of the 
Flemish or the Walloon and/or Belgian way of dealing with certain issues. Although 
immigration policies and the separation between church and state and the relationship 
between religions and world-views are federal and constitutional matters, policies regarding 
the integration of minorities and immigrants are regionalized. The result is that multicultural 
or integration policies in Flanders and Wallonia are understood in very divergent ways.1 
Whereas in Flanders ethnic-cultural minority policies or target group policies and the 
compulsory citizenisation trajectory have been clearly inspired by the Dutch example, the 
philosophy towards newcomers in Wallonia is geared towards social integration and 
                                                 
1
 This is firstly noticeable in the difference in terminology. Although in Flanders there is an ongoing discussion 
on the desirability of this terminology, the notion ‘allochthones’ is commonly employed, as appears from the 
name of the government supported umbrella organisation, the ‘Support Centre for Allochtonous Girls and 
Women’ (‘Steunpunt Allochtone Meisjes en Vrouwen’). This does not take away the fact that some individual 
women (and men) feel ‘allochtonised’ by this approach and do not wish to identify as allochtonous, but regard it 
as a stigmatising category. This viewpoint is felt stronger in the French-speaking and predominantly socialist 
region, where socio-economic and class position are employed as a primary frame of reference. The term is then 
rightly problematised in the case of the second and third generation: how long does one remain allochtonous? In 
Wallonia and Brussels the term ‘immigrant’ is more common and ‘allochtonous’ is perceived as stereotyping. 
The term migrant however, is also wrongly applied to Belgians from foreign origins who can in fact be marked 
as neither ‘immigrants’ nor ‘allochtonous’. (Commissie Interculturele Dialoog, 2004, pp. 41)  
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combating social exclusion, thus more closely aligned with the French republican model. This 
dichotomised representation is nonetheless a strong simplification of much more complex 
historical and social realities, as is illustrated by the special case of Brussels and the different 
historical fractures such as those between freethinkers and Catholics, that next to the 
linguistic-communitarian and ideological fractures, still influence the Belgian context and the 
institutional space in which claims to the full integration of newcomers and new citizens must 
be translated. Next to this complex constellation of internal political and social fractures the 
Belgian-Flemish multicultural context is also characterised by receptivity to external and 
sometimes contradictory influences from the neighbouring countries such as France and the 
Netherlands. This provides quite a unique framework in which the gender dimension next to, 
or better put, through which many other dimensions of diversity, - be it gradually – is 
manifesting itself in an unavoidably ambiguous manner.   
The tension between gender equality and cultural diversity in Belgium was first 
brought to the political agenda during the so-called headscarf debate that developed in the 
beginning of 2004 following the law against religious signs in France. Similar to France, it 
was more than a debate on the Belgian secular state and the interpretation of the neutrality 
principle in relation to the freedom of religion, as the equality between women and men was a 
central feature of this public discussion. Until this point the gender dimension had been 
largely absent in the otherwise rather sharp and political controversy surrounding 
multicultural society and the accommodation of Islam. The headscarf debate can therefore be 
seen as symptomatic for the way the debate on the tension between feminism and 
multiculturalism or gender equality and cultural diversity trickled and was selectively and 
rhetorically translated into different societal contexts and policy practices.  
Following the headscarf debate in Belgium ‘colonial feminist’ arguments on the 
incompatibility between feminism and multiculturalism were appropriated in order to 
underline the thesis of the ‘failure of multiculturalism’. This however has also led to a 
mobilisation of allochtonous women’s organisations 2  and Muslim women who reacted 
indignant on the rhetorical exploitation of feminism and women’s emancipation in the context 
of a racist assimilationist agenda and the manner in which the whole debate largely took place 
‘over their heads’. White’ women’s organisations were approached to take a stand and/or 
developed initiatives regarding the interculturalisation process of their organisations.  
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 Personally we prefer the term used in the Netherlands abbreviated as ‘zmv-women’, that stands for black, 
migrant and refugee women (‘zwarte, migranten- en vluchtelingenvrouwen’). However, in order to avoid 
confusion, in this paper we also apply the term ‘allochtonous women’ because this is commonly used in the 
(Flemish-Belgian) debate.   
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On the political level, next to policy proposals following the French example, initiatives were 
taken in view of improving intercultural and inter-ideological dialogue, and the discussion on 
the content of the neutrality principle and the Belgian secular state3 was launched. Whilst it 
did not lead to a similar ban of ‘ostentatious religious symbols’ in public schools and offices, 
the so-called Belgian headscarf controversy clearly revitalised the debate on the neutrality of 
the Belgian state. Finally, gender equality policies for women and men have explicitly 
attended to ‘diversity’ although this is conceptualised differently at the regional and federal 
level. 
Following the polarisation regarding Muslim minorities in which the so-called 
oppression of Muslim women has been a main focus, the issue of forced and bogus marriages 
was put on the agenda in late 2004. A law has been proposed making bogus marriages 
punishable by taking away Belgian nationality for those that have become Belgian through 
marriage.  
However, other issues in the conflict between gender equality and cultural diversity 
that have received vast public and political attention in other European countries such as 
“honour related violence” have received relatively little public attention.    
 
2. The Belgian headscarf controversy: a debate on gender equality or on laïcité? 
 
Similar to other European countries, throughout the late eighties and nineties most often at the 
local level there had been various discussions and law cases on the wearing of headscarves at 
public schools, or for example on passport photos. However, the more recent controversies 
that have brought the topic of gender equality and culture diversity to the forefront of media 
and political debate in Belgium, followed the extensive reporting on the findings of the 
French parliamentary commission ‘Stasi’ in November 2003, and the likelihood of a bill on 
the ban against ‘ostentatious’ religious symbols in public schools.  Inspired by the French ban 
on headscarves, at the beginning of 2004 the senators of the Walloon socialist (Anne-Marie 
Lizin, Parti Socialiste) and liberal parties (Alain Destexhe, Mouvement des Réformateurs 
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 De Belgian secular state has never been republican like France, and does not have a similar colonial past in 
which the hijab discourse has played an inferiorising role. The Belgian state recognises organised freethinking – 
in the French-speaking part of the country refereed to as ‘la laïcité’ – as one service among others. The 
ubiquitous presence of Catholicism in the social life has invoked a strong secular opposition, that has also been 
partly been revived in the wake of the headscarf debate. ‘Organised’ freethinking nevertheless, seems to be more 
closely aligned with pleas for active pluralism. The strong political and social embedding of the Christian pillar 
and the Christian-democratic party in Flanders holds up another mirror to new cultural-religious minorities to 
develop their claims to social integration.  
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Libéraux) launched a proposal to ban the headscarf in public schools and services. The 
Minister of Societal Integration and Equal Opportunities Marie Arena (Parti Socialiste) 
reacted negatively at this proposition and in a call not to limit the intercultural debate to the 
headscarf, took on the initiative of establishing a Commission on Intercultural Dialogue.  
This federal commission, which took a start in February 2004, was instructed to draw 
up a state of affairs on intercultural relations on the basis of consultations with practitioners, 
representatives of religions and world-views, institutional representatives and academic 
experts around four working themes: citizenship, equality between men and women, the basic 
principles of governments services and the status of religion in a society with a predominantly 
non-confessional character. Whereas the report of the Commission, published in May 2005, 
did not offer a clear advice on the way the separation of church and state or the neutrality of 
the state should be interpreted in relation to the wearing of religious symbols in public 
services, it did stimulate the opening of a larger societal debate by presenting different but 
acceptable interpretations of the meaning of ‘neutrality’. The wearing of the headscarf is not 
discussed in the report under the heading of gender issues, which mainly concerned the legal 
status of women in international family law, but was implicated under the heading of state-
neutrality and religious signs. The only gendered concern which is left in the report is a 
suggestion to measure the impact of a possible ban on the wearing of religious signs on the 
employment of women in public services.  
From an initial focus on gender equality, the headscarf debate shifted towards a focus 
on public neutrality and the Belgian secular state. The Commission considers three different 
viewpoints as defendable regarding the meaning of neutrality in fulfilling state positions. The 
first position, that of freedom of religion and inclusive neutrality, regards the exclusive 
understanding of neutrality as problematic in that it predominantly excludes signs that do not 
belong to the North European tradition and thus pleas for a no-limits approach to wearing 
religious signs by civil servants. The defenders of this first position argue that non-
discrimination and neutrality should follow from the acts rather than the outward appearance 
of civil servants. The second viewpoint concerns a kind of state neutrality and therefore 
demands ‘restraint’ or a prohibition on any kind of expression of religious conviction on the 
part of civil servants, yet only for those who in office come into contact with the public and/or 
have a kind of authority relation. The third – republican – position, asks for strict neutrality 
with absence of any religious sign for all government officials, including those who do not 
come into contact with the public. In this viewpoint, public neutrality is prioritised above 
freedom of religion and neutrality is not only understood as an issue of deeds but also applies 
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to the appearance of civil servants. The CID ultimately does not defend one of these positions 
over another, but does in fact launch the idea that neutrality does not have to imply the 
eradication of all religious and ideological signs from clothing in government services. It thus 
does not suggest that the principle of neutrality itself (like that of freedom of religion and the 
equality principle) would be at stake, but rather questions how it must be applied in practice; 
whether one should strive to a further neutralising of public spaces and services, or 
conversely, if a more inclusive kind of neutrality is possible that on equal footing can give 
expression to the diversity of multicultural society.   
 
3. Islam in the Belgian state  
  
Among the more profound dimensions of cultural diversity, religion assumes a fundamental 
position. Secularisation in Belgium has not resulted in a strict separation between state and 
church as in France, but in a mutual accordance, thereby privileging the Catholic Church. All 
Belgian citizens contribute to the financing of the services of religious and philosophical 
communities (including the secular humanists), regardless of their personal conviction or 
income. The state, therefore, on the one hand appears to take a neutral and tolerant stance vis-
à-vis religions and the Weltanschauungen of its citizens, yet decides on which religions and 
communities it shall recognise and finance. Officially, this recognition and financing is based 
on the general social, humanist and moral concerns that they may represent, but in practice 
recognition and financing is mostly a case of lobbying and the Catholic Church is clearly 
privileged in the allocation of government resources.4  Following the settlement of ‘guest 
worker’ immigrants from Muslim countries such as Morocco and Turkey, Islam became the 
country’s second religion. Although it was recognised as an official religion in 1974, this has 
not entailed equal treatment on par with other religions and worldviews. Despite the 
progressive decline in the practice of Catholicism, it still enjoys a privileged position and 
receives the vast majority of financial resources. Whereas in counting the number of 
adherents, Islam is the second largest religion in the country, only a tiny proportion of 
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 At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Catholicism and Protestantism were recognised, followed by the 
Anglican, Israelite (1870), Islamic (1974) and orthodox (1985) services. A number of non-confessional 
communities have been subsidised by the state since 1993. Despite the fact that the number of practising 
Catholics has dwindled substantially during the last three decades, Catholicism still enjoys a privileged position 
and receives the vast majority of the financial resources. Its dotation is determined by the number of inhabitants 
of a parish, regardless of the fact if these are practising Catholics. Although in numbers, Islam is the second 
biggest religion of the country, only a tiny proportion of the subsidies is allocated per practising Muslim. (cf. 
Husson, 2004) In order to rectify this imbalance in the allocation of resources, initiatives are being taken on 
designing a kind of ideological and religious registration of inhabitants at the local level.  
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subsidies are distributed per practising Muslim. Although the extent to which ‘Islam’ is a 
determinant of Muslim identity is debateable, and the way in which it is defined and 
experienced among Muslim minorities varies considerably, in general there is an evolution of 
socio-ethnic stratification at a religious level.   
Prudential arguments will probably have a larger influence upon a fair subsidising of 
Islam in Belgium than distributive justice arguments. For financing would also imply that the 
Belgian government can place demands and exert influence and control, and for example 
form a counterbalance against the often conservative and fundamentalist influences from 
foreign donor countries. 
One of the most striking and fairly unique effects of the secularisation process in 
Belgian society has been that of ‘pillarisation’: the creation of a network of resources and 
instruments (from political parties, trade unions to holiday resorts) carried by the community 
of citizens. As Timmerman (2003: 20) argues, these pillars stand in ambiguous relation to the 
nation state in which they function; they diminish the identification of the citizen with the 
nation state through the feeling of belonging to one’s own – catholic, socialist or liberal – 
nest, yet simultaneously contribute to its social cohesion. For immigrants this has meant that 
despite not having gone through a similar process of secularisation, in order to claim a place 
within the host society they are forced to apply the same pillarisation logic. Hence, the debate 
on the formation of an ‘Islamic pillar’. On the one hand it is doubted that this will benefit the 
emancipation – e.g., through erecting Islamic schools – of Muslim minorities. On the other 
hand it cannot be denied that the ‘pillarisation’ is still a reality in Belgium, and that 
withholding the same opportunities to religious minorities implies a breach of the equality 
principle. However, at this moment reality is far removed from the creation of an allochtonous 
or Islamic pillar. The established pillarised organisations – for example the labour unions – 
have embarked on efforts to accommodate new minorities under the heading of diversity 
(Flanders/Brussels) and/or anti-discrimination (Wallonia) policies.     
Like in other European countries, Islam as a religion, but also as a collective identity is 
now part of the Belgian political space, upon which allochthones are mobilising. Following 
events such as 9/11/2001 and the headscarf controversy in Belgium, certain Muslim women 
are claming their right to symbolise their religious convictions publicly.  
 
4. The mobilisation of Muslim girls and women  
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In the headscarf controversies a (false) ideology of feminism as the mark of western 
civilization was strategically being co-opted in a colonial discourse that pits any form of 
gender justice against cultural pluralism. At worst it has contributed to an essentialist 
discourse on Islam as inherently oppressive to women and irreconcilable with western values, 
whereas discussion took place ‘over the heads’ of the actual women concerned. During the 
headscarf debate in the media and political agenda, - notwithstanding various protest marches 
on Antwerp and Brussels – the voices of Muslim women were hardly listened to and the 
discussion mostly took place ‘over their heads’. As a reaction to this exclusion, and the way in 
which the liberation of the Muslim woman had become the stake of a polarisation between 
minorities and the dominant society in Belgium, some 32 allochtonous women’s organisations 
signed an open letter to Minister of Internal Affairs Patrick Dewael, in reaction to his essay 
“forced veiling is unacceptable.”5 This mobilisation further crystallised into the erection of 
self organisations such as the Action Committee of Muslim Women in Flanders (AMV, 
2005a: 4). The platform ‘Keep off my headscarf’ (Blijf van mijn hoofddoek) in Mechelen was 
also established and launched a petition against any rule that would curtail wearing the 
headscarf at school. (www.bismillah.be/blijfvanmijnhoofddoek) The Centre for Allochtonous 
Girls and Women (SAMV), an umbrella organisation of allochtonous women’s organisations 
that is supported by the Flemish government, was also dismayed at the way the discussion 
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 The peak of the headscarf debate in Flanders was to follow the publication of the essay “Forced veiling is 
unacceptable” by Patrick Dewael (2004), the liberal vice prime-minister and minister of Internal Affairs of the 
federal government, which was published simultaneously in main French and Dutch-language newspapers on 
January 10th. According to Dewael in his essay (2004), although groups demanding for their freedom of religion 
defend the ‘right’ of Muslim women to wear the headscarf, in practice this would often come down to the 
“implicit acceptance of the order by Muslim men that their women must be veiled.” The author concurs with the 
claim of Chiraq that “the degree of civilization depends on the position of women in that society” and 
consequently any kind of forced veiling is unacceptable in as much as forced marriages, sexual mutilation and 
polygamy. Although it is noted that one “should respect those that veil voluntarily,” the “true motives of those 
enforcing the veil must be unmasked” and “through the law we must protect those who need our protection.” 
This essay unleashed a host of responses, and almost daily the newspapers had their special rubrics on the so-
called ‘veil debate.’  Noticeable is the way Dewael rhetorically links the headscarf to practices such as sexual 
mutilation, forced marriages, gang rape, and so on. What is especially remarkable is that he draws on (non-
academic) publications by Muslim women ‘in their own voices’ who have ‘cast off the veil.’ Among others, 
Dewael refers to the Iranian writer Chahdortt Djavann, whose essay Bas les voiles! was translated into Dutch the 
following month. In the mean time Djavann has been interviewed in many a journal and on prime time TV. Her 
basic view is that any kind of veiling would symbolize the status of women as ‘sex objects’ and ‘potential 
sinners,’ and that those Muslim girls in the French bidonvilles would merely be veiling out of protection against 
male sexual aggression. Another ‘liberated’ secular Muslim woman’s voice that the author refers to is that of 
Ayaan Hirsi Ali. Hirsi Ali gained much public attention with her sharp critique of ‘Islam,’ as what she perceives 
to be the central factor accounting for the problem of the integration of minorities in the Netherlands (Hirsi Ali 
2002). Before she was – once more - forced into hiding after a series of death threats, among which that 
following the murder of the director Theo van Gogh in November 2004, for which she wrote the script for the 
film Submission, Hirsi Ali had become increasingly popular among the right-wing faction of Flemish liberal 
politicians (mostly male) and was often invited for speeches in those contexts.    
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took place ‘over’ instead of ‘with’ the groups in question an supports a kind of ‘positive 
neutrality’ in which pupils, teachers and civil servants have the right to wear the headscarf.  
Seeing that the dominant discourse on the presumption that headscarf wearing women 
would be ‘forced’ or could impossibly be ‘emancipated’ was not supported by any research 
on empirical evidence, organisations such as AMV or the Brussels-based Al-Marifa have 
organised their own surveys among Muslim women on wearing and not-wearing the 
headscarf.6  More recent research in Belgium (cf. Dala, 2005; Van der Heyden, Geets & 
Vanderwaeren, 2005; Vanderwaeren, 2005) and neighbouring countries (cf. Afshar, Aitken & 
Franks, 2005; Amiraux, 2003; Bartels, 2005) also wipes the floor with the simplistic 
association between the headscarf and oppression for the vast majority of Muslim women in 
the West. It is then often referred to the growing individual emancipatory identity politics for 
the second or third generation of Muslim women of this faith based practice.  
Typical of the headscarf controversy is the one-sided way in which in very essentialist 
terms the relation between gender inequality and religion was discussed. The position of 
women had only been related to Islam, whereas it had never been an argument before to 
question, for example, the privileging and government subsidising of the Catholic Church that 
among others still refuses to open the priesthood to women. Whereas gender equality is 
anchored in the Belgian constitution, it also allows for an exemption in the framework of the 
equally constitutionally protected freedom of religion. This additionally illustrates how the 
feminism-multiculturalism debate is selectively used to stigmatise Islamic and Muslim 
minorities.  
 
5. Gendering inclusive neutrality? 
 
In general, the headscarf debate can be contextualised within a broader debate on citizenship 
and the definition of national/regional identity opposed to other European countries on 
cultural and religious pluralism with the Belgian-nation state. Thus a headscarf ban as in 
secular-republican France has not been issued due to, among others, the specificity of state-
church relations, the history of ‘pillarisation’ and the refracted school system. However, 
schools and organisations are still allowed to implement restrictions. Schools boards decide 
                                                 
6
 AMV undertook a select sample of 225 Muslim women and girls from the province of Antwerp in the age 
category of 11-52. The largest group was of Moroccan origin, but women and girls of Turkish origins did make 
up an important percentage. A small minority of autochtonous Muslim converts with and without headscarves 
also took part. Both girls and women with and without headscarves participated. (AMV, 2005b). Al’Marifa 
(‘The Knowledge’) distributed and processed a survey in 2004 among predominantly 1000 women of Moroccan 
and Turkish origins from the capital region of Brussels (Al’Marifa 2004). 
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autonomously whether they either allow or forbid the wearing of the headscarf by pupils 
and/or teachers. This applies to various educational structures, including catholic, official, 
provincial and local educational networks. Not one of the institutional organisations has taken 
in a general position, but leaves the issue in the hands of the local autonomy of the schools. A 
number of court cases initiated by Muslim women against wearing head coverings at their 
schools have been rejected.  
Currently being discussed are issues such as what state neutrality might actually mean 
for civil servants, and whether one may wear religious signs. The principle of neutrality as 
such is not at stake, but rather how it should be applied: by the inclusion of differences, or 
conversely, through their neutralisation. Belgium thus sways between on the one hand the 
political project of a ‘religious allotment country’, as Paul de Hert (2006: 122) describes the 
situation in the Netherlands and Germany, and on the other the French republican ideal that 
prioritises a further secularisation of the public sphere and space. 
The new ‘intercultural’ notion of ‘active pluralism’ is also a concept that is gaining 
more and more popularity among politicians (cf. Stevaert, 2005) and the broad public. The 
concept – even though the reflection upon this concept is only in its initial phase – refers to a 
position in which religious diversity must be maximally supported and thus moves beyond the 
Rawlsian-liberal notion. Active pluralism implies that after a deep encounter with one’s own 
tradition, one can actively explore the other by way of an open intercultural dialogue.7  
Some public services, such as the VDAB (Flemish Public Employment Service) have 
already adopted a stance in favour of inclusive neutrality; among others it is currently being 
discussed. Pleas for inclusive neutrality in schools and public services are also supported by 
referring to the less appealing alternative of the formation of an Islamic pillar. 
Notable is the way the Flemish Women’s Deliberation Committee (Vrouwen Overleg 
Komitee, VOK) also defends the idea of inclusive neutrality that would allow for Muslim 
women to wear their headscarf in their profession, whereas the same organisation had for 
years striven vehemently against the ubiquitous influence of the Catholic Church within the 
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 Ludo Abicht, for example, sees active pluralism as authentic pluralism: “Authentic pluralism, whereby one 
aspires to approach the other actively as well as wishes to preserve the plurality of life stances, must be 
understood as an interest in, an inter-est for other life stances. For it is important, to all of us to get to know the 
other approach to shared life questions and as it were, to place ourselves in the mentality of the other, to 
understand as much as we can from the inside and to feel how others solve, look at and try to solve the same 
general human problems.” (Abicht, 2006: 231). However, Paul De Hert (2006) is also highly critical of the 
project of active pluralism and warns how easy the concept can be (mis)appropriated by the well-organised 
catholic block as means to hold on to the waning influence of its own life stance among the public. The fact that 
the public space in Flanders is a pillarised space, cannot be sufficient argument to strive towards an active 
pluralism in the place of retaining the already achieved status quo, according to De Hert. (2006: 121-122) 
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public sphere. Clearly inspired by the report of the Commission on Intercultural Dialogue, the 
VOK defends the position of inclusive neutrality that would allow Muslim women to wear the 
headscarf in their employment in public services. (VOK, 2005) It thus clearly chooses for an 
anti-racist position to which secularisation is subordinated.  
However, pleas for inclusive neutrality are principally not limited to the wearing of the 
headscarf. What is advocated here is not an exemption to a general rule in favour of the 
emancipation of minority women, but a revision of a current – however implicit and not 
realized – interpretation of neutrality in the public domain.   
 
6. Towards a feminist viewpoint on interculturality in white women’s organisations 
 
Whereas a few allochtonous politicians had put the emancipation of allochtonous women on 
the political agenda, none of these have conceived the headscarf affair to be a priority in 
Belgium. Some individual ‘white feminists’, nevertheless publicly defended an anti-hijab 
stance during the headscarf debate, out of a concern for the perceived detrimental effects for 
the position of allochtonous women according to a cultural relativist view on religion and 
culture. (cf. Mia Doornaert in De Standaard, 10/11/04). 
Women’s organisations such as the Dutch-speaking Women’s Council 
(Nederlandstalige Vrouwenraad) did not immediately formulate a point of view regarding the 
headscarf yet rejected the way in which women ‘s emancipation was being instrumentalised 
by ‘white knights’ who ‘in their name’ were supposedly defending the rights of oppressed 
veiled Muslim women. To date the Women’s Council has not achieved consensus as to which 
position should be taken regarding the headscarf. Consequently, the debate initiated a 
discussion on the relationship between feminism and multiculturalism and has even led to an 
interculturalisation process in Flemish women’s organisations (cf. S’Jegers, 2006). The 
Dutch-speaking Women’s Council - an umbrella organisation of different Flemish women’s 
organisations that in 2005 celebrated its 100 years of existence - started with an internal 
diversity process ‘Towards a colourful Women’s Council’ (2005-2006), aiming among others, 
- and encouraged by the subsidising Minister – to include allochtonous women’s 
organisations in its organisation. The Women’s Deliberation Committee (Vrouwen Overleg 
Komitee - VOK), the oldest still remaining organisation of the second feminist wave in 
Flanders, in which individual women represent themselves, now also counts Muslim feminists 
among its active members. In 2005 the Committee published the brochure A feminist look at 
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multiculturality (Een feministische kijk op multiculturaliteit), in which, for example, the 
‘western Eurocentric appropriation’ of feminism and universal values is criticised.  
 
7. Policies in gender quality and cultural diversity  
 
Whereas the headscarf debate in 2004-2005 can be viewed as the most salient example of the 
way the tensions between gender equality and cultural diversity have been played out in 
Belgium with various concrete effects on public discourse and policies pertaining to broad 
issues such as multiculturalism, the relationship between religion and state and the status of 
minority women, the latter has also received some specific attention during recent years 
within equal opportunities policy. After decennia of feminist struggle gender equality in itself, 
as in other countries, is anchored in the Belgian constitution, law and policy. Current equal 
opportunities policies in Belgium are implemented at both the federal and the community 
level and are defined both horizontally (gender mainstreaming in all department policies) and 
vertically (specific measures for achieving gender equality). Nominally, besides women, 
allochthones, disabled people, LGBs and the elder also come under equal opportunities 
policy.  
At the federal level, the current Minister for Civil services, social integration, cities 
policy and equal opportunities, Christian Dupont (Parti Socialiste) has prioritised attention to 
‘migrant women’ in his policy. This mainly involves the finalisation of the International 
Private Law (the problem of repudiation) and sensibilisation surrounding the Moudawana (the 
reform of Moroccan family law and repercussions thereof for Moroccan women in Belgium). 
Priority is being given to the legal status of women of foreign origins through the erection of 
‘Support Centres International Private Law for Women of foreign origins’. These centres have 
the task to inform women and to assist them in defending their rights. A second priority but 
little concretised theme is the ‘impact of policy on the social and professional mobility of 
women of foreign origins’ (www. christiandupont.be: beleid - interculturaliteit) 
Differences in the communitarian conceptions of equal opportunities policy explicitly 
aimed at women in minority groups already become apparent in the way this group is 
conceptually designated and forms a first important stake in the articulation of policies: 
‘allochtonous women’ (Flemish policy) and respectively ‘migrant women’ (federal and 
Walloon policy). The last, although theoretically, excludes second and third generations.   
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In sum we can state that Flemish minority policy allows ‘allochtonous’ women more 
‘visibility’ in terms of policy measures, whereas on the French-speaking side the stigmatising 
effects of the focus on ethnicity are emphasised and the way this artificially deepens the 
divide between groups among the population.     
Whereas minority women were practically invisible in the previous Flemish legislature 
(which focused on issues such as parity or the equal political representation of women on the 
one hand and the emancipation of minorities on the other), the current Flemish minister of 
Equal Opportunities has set out in her policy letter (2004-2009) in the language of a 
transversal equal opportunities approach and in applying intersectional terminology, to 
completely prioritise the emancipation of allochtonous (in particular Muslim) women, next to 
‘the emancipation of men’, and achieving equality for LGBs, single mothers, low-income and 
older women. Characteristic for the greater part of gender equity philosophy and policy in 
general, is the underlying idea that for the vast majority of autochthonous women 
emancipation and equality are already achieved.  
The same minister has approached Muslim women’s secular and religious (self) 
organizations, and is entertaining the route of Islam as a means to emancipation for Muslim 
women. This appears as a striking move in the context of a secular democracy, and especially 
in a climate in which the place of religion in the public sphere and the relationship between 
religion and politics are being debated anew. The Support Centre for Allochtonous Girls and 
Women that is subsidised by the Flemish government is starting up an experimental project in 
2006 in a number of Muslim women’s groups in Flanders on the Koran as an instrument of 
emancipation.  
The cabinet has also recently approached Muslim women’s organizations through 
‘living room conversations’ in order to start up a dialogue that may lead to concrete actions. 
This included, for example an invitation to the play ‘The Veiled Monologues’ followed by 
discussion between the organizations, the Minster and the director and actors of the play. A 
number of Muslim women walked out during the play and afterwards much critique was 
launched at the Minister for the way such initiatives only contribute to the portrayal of 
Muslim women in an orientalist and ‘sexualized’ manner, whilst Muslim men are portrayed as 
oppressors. Grass root organizations (cf. ‘Keep off my headscarf’) have also criticized the 
way ‘art’ is being used to deal with what they perceive to be ‘political’ problems, such as 
discrimination in education and employment (Het Nieuwsblad, 18/04/05).  
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In Wallonia, the Ministry of Social Action, Health and Equal Opportunities has 
prioritised the following issues after taking stock of Beijing+10: domestic violence, social 
housing for battered women, parity on communal and regional election lists, and practical and 
institutional support for (the mostly female) caretakers of the aged and disabled. Finally, the 
current minister plans to combat sexism in education and employment, with particular 
attention to immigrant women and women from foreign backgrounds.8 
Next to equality policy, the Flemish minority policy is also an institutional space in 
which allochtonous women as a specific category are trying to articulate their concerns, next 
to numerous other domains, institutions and structures, such as education, health care, 
welfare, etc. Acquiring a strategic-emancipatory position as a specific target group is 
nevertheless an ambiguous undertaking, that with Gloria Wekker (2002) can be best described 
metaphorically as ‘building nests in a windy place’.  
 
8. Family and honour related violence  
 
The current National Action Plan against Partner Violence (2004-2007) is solely directed 
towards (ex)partner violence, opposed to an earlier action plan (2001-2003) that comprised a 
much broader notion of violence including domains such as violence within the contexts of 
the workplace, human trafficking, asylum policy, international relations and development 
cooperation. This narrowing down has implications for the attention to violence against 
women of minority and immigration backgrounds.  
On the other hand, research into the prevalence and types of violence against women 
(in its broadest definition) of minority groups has been rather scant in Belgium, which can 
partly be explained by a reluctance to register ethnicity in data banks and social analyses, 
especially in the sphere of violence and criminality. Opponents on the multiculturalists’ side 
have argued that registration often leads to a reification of target groups that may acquire a 
pejorative connotation.  
Minor media attention has been given to the perceived rise among ‘allochtonous’ 
women in women’s shelters. According to a report on homelessness and general welfare work 
in Flanders in 2003, allochtonous women make up more than the half of the inhabitants of 
                                                 
8
 The Direction for Equal Opportunities of the French-Walloon government broadened its notion of equality 
beyond that of equality between women and men in 1999. Among its actions has been the development of 
pedagogical material on the status of women in secondary education, the support of projects pertaining to 
combating violence against women, and the representation of women in local politics. In 2004 the government 
ordered an exploratory study on forced marriages in the French-speaking community in order to offer 
suggestions on prevention and aid to both female and male victims of the practice. 
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some shelters. It often concerns women of the second or third generation with Belgian 
nationalities that have left their husbands. However, this does not lead to the conclusion that 
partner violence would be more prevalent than in autochthonous families in Belgium. It can 
also be explained by the fact that allochtonous women reside longer in the shelters than 
autochtonous women, due to their often precarious economic and social status. Another 
assertion is that minority women are almost completely absent in ambulant social care 
settings.   
In contrast to other countries and those cases abroad that have received some press 
coverage, until recently similarly hardly any attention has been given to honour-related 
violence on Belgian territory. On 16 December 2005 the Kurdish Institute in Brussels together 
with the Federation of Flemish Women’s groups organised a conference on honour-related 
violence. With this conference they hope to stimulate different governments and authorities in 
Belgium to deal with the phenomenon of HRV. That cases of HRV do prevail in Belgium is 
shown by e.g., Clycq et al. study (2004) in which conversations with social workers on 
‘honour revenge’ and the locking up of partners is mentioned as a typical form of violence 
and as a specific form of legitimizing. Autochthonous perpetrators of violence are less apt to 
account for their acts of violence in terms of honour or refer to their culture or religion, but 
will refer to serious acts of violence as ‘passionate’.  
In response to some interpolations, inspired by Dutch studies, on this topic the 
Minister of Justice explained that honour related violence is not retained as a parameter in the 
national police data bank, nor do police officers receive any specialised training on the 
subject. Other interpolations have been met with numbers like some 5 honour killings having 
been committed in Belgium during the last 6 years and without any notable increase. The 
Minister of Justice has nevertheless promised (beginning 2006) to start up an action plan on 
intra-familial violence following experimental projects in the Netherlands. The problem of 
honour revenge would also be taken up in the context of ‘partner violence’ in higher 
education.  
 Despite the absence of or minimal attention by both politicians and the media, 
according to fieldworkers and practice experts, such as those present at the HRV conference 
in Brussels, honour related violent practices such as ‘forced marriages’, ‘forced abortions’ and 
‘forced virginity’ (with consequent requests for hymen repair) are nevertheless present among 
minority and immigrant communities in Belgium.  
However, there is also some reluctance to categorise and address violence against 
women as honour-related, since the notion itself refers to ‘other’ cultures and can therefore 
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easily used to stigmatise certain minority groups. Instead of ‘culturalising’ the needs of 
minority women, fieldworkers and self-organisations such as the SAMV give preferential 
attention to the ‘interculturalisation’ of services in society, working towards a greater 
inclusiveness and responsiveness for the needs of minority groups.  
 
9. Genital Mutilation  
 
Genital mutilation is described as another form of violence against women, which regardless 
of its general ‘orientalist’ fascination among the public and in the media, its incidence in 
Belgium has not been problematised to any great extent. Despite the fact that Belgium passed 
a specific criminal law provision prohibiting female genital mutilation in 2000, to date no 
national court cases concerning FGM have occurred. On the basis of a limited case study 
(excluding factors such as ethnicity, illegal immigrants and migrants with a Belgian 
nationality) researchers from the International Centre for Reproductive Health in Ghent have 
roughly estimated the number of women and girls in Belgium that could be affected by FGM 
at 2.745 on a total population of over 10 million (De Leye & Deblonde 2004). Although 
health workers admit to being confronted with the consequences of FGM and with the request 
for reinfibulation, knowledge among aspects of FGM among professionals is scarce, nor are 
the legal aspects known (De Leye, Deblonde & Timmerman 2004). In May 2006, a 
parliamentary question was raised to the Minister of Justice, inspired by actions in Denmark 
and Finland, and proposing to effectively pursue parents who send their children abroad for 
this form of mutilation.            
  
10. Concluding remarks 
 
The way in which gender and multicultural issues are articulated in any case illustrates the 
different fractures and complex political relations that mark the Belgian landscape and the 
diverse and ambiguous impact of developments in neighbouring countries, which are utmost 
difficult to ascertain. On the one hand the consecutive electoral victories and the xenophobic 
populism of the right-wing party Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest) have exerted a profound 
influence upon integration and minority policies. Gender issues, such as the presumed 
oppression of ‘the allochtonous or migrant woman’ are thereby often symbolically and 
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literally deployed in view of assimilationist agendas.9 These attitudes no doubt mirror general 
tendencies such as immigration policies in other countries (for example on forced and bogus 
marriages), or the idea of a ‘clash between civilisations’ in which the West is celebrated as the 
sole and ultimate defender of women’s rights. Women in migrant and minority groups are 
thus often the stake of an agenda that transcends their interests as they are active participants 
and actors struggling to be recognized as equal partners in debates and policies on 
multiculturalism and equal opportunities.  
On the other hand a radical shift in multicultural policies has not (yet?) taken place as 
is the case in the Netherlands and France; Flanders in contrast to the Netherlands by whom it 
was inspired, still holds on to a group oriented ethnic minority policy. The explanation for this 
is a very complex one and is partly related to electoral dynamics and the political embargo 
(cordon sanitair) to form a coalition with the extreme right wing party Vlaams Belang (cf. 
Jacobs, 2004). Some events, such as the anonymous death threats in 2005 which demanded 
the resignation of Naïma Amzil, because of her headscarf, also held a mirror to the Belgian 
population, to which terrible intolerance the stigmatisation of other cultures and religions 
could lead. Because of her composed reaction, and especially her West-Flemish accent, 
Naïma gained much sympathy among the Belgian public. This appreciation thus seems to 
testify to multicultural toleration, yet at the same time reveals the astonishment on how a 
headscarf-wearing woman of Moroccan origin could possibly be integrated to the extent that 
she had mastered the local dialect. This case nevertheless contributed to a certain shift in the 
debate on the emancipation of Muslim women, by bringing the problem of racist and gender 
specific ethnic discrimination in the workplace into the public eye.10  
The recent shooting by a young Flemish man with family ties to the extreme right 
party the Flemish Interest of two minority women and a young girl in broad daylight in the 
city of Antwerp and a number of other violent racist attacks in the Spring of 2006, have also 
                                                 
9
 After the death threats regarding the Amzil case, Flemish Interest party president Filip Dewinter sticks to his 
viewpoint: “Who wears a headscarf, shows unwillingness to integration (…).” (Het Laatste Nieuws, 28/12/04: 
website Vlaams Belang/Filip Dewinter) 
10
 Recently the low labour rate of ‘allochtonous’ women has been denounced. Here we can similarly detect 
different ideological discourses: on the left attention is focussed on the problem of neglect in education and 
discrimination and racism on the labour market. Until recently little attention was given to the gender dimension. 
The misconception (cf. Martens, Ouali, e.a., 2005: 31) is that ‘allochtonous’ girls by virtue of their higher school 
achievements would experience relatively less discrimination on the labour market compared to ‘allochtonous’ 
boys. On the right the low labour participation of allochtonous women is often translated in ‘culturalist’ terms. 
Bart Somers, president of the Flemish Liberal Party (VLD) explains the low working rate among Turkish and 
Moroccan women through ‘the social pressure from for example the husband’ (website ‘Vijfkamp voor aanpak 
werkloosheid bij allochtonen’). The impact of negative image regarding Muslim women (cf. E-Quality, 2005) is 
not acknowledged in this kind of discourse, neither is the ethno-stratification of the labour market and the 
problem of underachievement that highly educated allochtonous women suffer from (especially in Brussels. 
(Brussels Observatorium van de Arbeidsmarkt en Kwalificaties, 2004: 25). 
 17
opened up a public debate on the extent to which racism has become structurally 
institutionalised in all of Belgian society. Paradoxically, within this context critiques on 
current multicultural policies as contributing to a dangerous “group-oriented thinking” are 
also articulated by spokesmen of the Flemish liberal party.   
Whereas public attention for integration and multiculturalism never seems to cease in 
Flanders, at the moment of writing this paper the question of gender equality and cultural 
diversity is not a very prominent one in public debate. It however remains salient in other core 
debates such as on religion and the state, and is also taken up and implemented in policy-
making and different civil society organisations and institutions, e.g. within the 
implementation of diversity policies and/or gender mainstreaming. Theoretically included in 
both domains of policy-making, in practice minority women still have to go a long way in the 
struggle for recognition - as women in minorities or as minority women - within the different 
societal and institutional domains such as labour unions, political parties, health care, 
education, social services. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss this in a fair manner 
but the issue of the integration and accommodation of minority women’s claims and needs 
‘from below’ is nevertheless a very important one that should not be neglected, and more in 
particular in the pillarised Belgian society where the so-called ‘midfield’ (middenveld) is very 
important to policy-making and social cohesion.   
Finally, the focus in this paper on minority women with a Muslim background does 
not imply that they are the only significant minority women’s group in Belgian society. As we 
have already explained in our first paper, due to old and new immigrant flows, Belgium is a 
very multi-ethnic/multicultural and diversifying society. Nevertheless, in line with global 
dynamics regarding Islam and Muslim minorities, the attention in public debate is very much 
focused on Islam and Muslim identities, Whereas religious identification is stimulated by the 
strategic opportunities for recognition it offers to minorities by the Belgian state, the 
historical-pragmatic – and to a much less extent debated - outcome of the typical Belgian 
secular state is now being questioned and/or re-funded. In these discussions gender-related 
issues have played, and will no doubt continue to play, - albeit often selectively and 





Abicht, L. (2006). Actief pluralisme. Zeven stellingen. In E. Brems & R. Stockx (Red.). Recht 
en minderheden. De ene diversiteit is de andere niet. Reeks: Tegenspraak-cahier 26 (pp. 221-
233). Brugge: Die Keure.  
Afshar, H., Aitken, R. & Franks, M. (2005). Feminisms, Islamophobia and Identities. 
Political Studies, 53(2), 262-283.   
Al Ma’rifa (De Kennis) v.z.w. (2004). Onderzoeksrapport “Het dragen van de hoofddoek: 
vrije keuze of dwang?”. Brussel: april-juni 2004. 
Amiraux, V. (2003). Discours voilés sur les musulmanes en Europe: comment les 
musulmanes sont-ils devenues des musulmanes? Social Compass, 50(1), 85-96.    
AMV (2005a). Editoriaal. Vooruit! Driemaandelijks tijdschrift van het AMV, 1(1): 4. 
AMV (2005b). AMV Enquête rond de hoofddoek. Vooruit! Driemaandelijks tijdschrift van 
het AMV, 1(2): 25-28. 
Bartels, E. (2005). ‘Wearing a Headscarf is My Personal Choice’ (Jasmina, 16 years). Islam 
and Christian – Muslim Relations, 16(1): 15-28. 
Brussels Observatorium van de Arbeidsmarkt en Kwalificaties (2004). Situatie van 
de vrouwen op de arbeidsmarkt in het Brussels Hoofdstedelijk Gewest. Brussel: Brussels  
Observatorium van de Arbeidsmarkt en Kwalificaties.  
Clycq, N., Lodewyckx. & C. Timmerman (2004). Huwelijksdynamiek in allochtone 
gemeenschappen in relatie tot faciliterende factoren met betrekking tot intra-familiaal 
geweld. Een verkenning van de bestaande wetenschappelijke literatuur. Steunpunt 
Gelijkekansenbeleid. Consortium Universiteit Antwerpen & Limburgs Universitair Centrum. 
Commissie Interculturele Dialoog (2005). Eindverslag en Getuigenissen. Overhandigd aan de 
Minister van gelijke kansen, sociale integratie en interculturaliteit, Christian Dupont, mei 
2005. Brussel. 
Dala, N. (2005). Als sluiers vallen. Vrouwenportretten. Antwerpen: Uitgeverij Houtekiet. 
De Hert, P. (m.m.v. Matthijs N., El Jaouhari H. & Dauw B.) (2006). Sterven als vorm van 
integratie. Een republikeinse halt tegen actief pluralistische begrafeniswetten. In E. Brems & 
R. Stockx (Red.). Recht en minderheden. De ene diversiteit is de andere niet. Reeks: 
Tegenspraak-cahier 26 (pp. 107-134). Brugge: Die Keure. 
Dewael, P. (2004). Elke dwang tot sluieren is onaanvaardbaar, De Morgen, 01/10/2004 
E-Quality (2005). Factsheet. Discriminatie en beeldvorming op de arbeidsmarkt. Een 
Intersectionele aanpak gericht op gender en etniciteit. E-Quality: Kenniscentrum voor 
emancipatie in de multiculturele samenleving. 
 
 19
Hirsi Ali, A. (2002). De zoontjesfabriek: over vrouwen, islam en integratie. Amsterdam: 
Augustus.  
Husson, J-F. (2004). Le financement des cultes et de la laïcité en Belgique. In J-F Husson 
(Red.) Financement des cultes et de la laïcité : comparaison internationale et perspectives, 
Actes du colloque organisé le 8 octobre 2004, (pp. 23-49). Namur: ORACLE, N.E.W., 
CIFoP.  
Jacobs, D. (2004). Alive and Kicking? Multiculturalism in Flanders, International Journal in 
Multicultural Societies, 6 (2), 280-297. 
Leye, E. & Deblonde, J.  (2004). Belgian legislation regarding female genital mutilation and 
the implementation of the law in Belgium, ICRH Publications N° 9, Gent.   
Leye, E., Deblonde J. & Temmerman, M. (2004). “Vrouwenbesnijdenis in Europa. Enkele 
knelpunten in de aanpak van de gezondheidszorg, wetgeving en preventie.” In: G. Coene & C. 
Longman (eds.), Eigen Emancipatie Eerst? Over de rechten en representatie van vrouwen in 
een multiculturele samenleving, Academia Press, 2005, p. 55-68 
Martens, A., Ouali, N. e.a. (2005). Etnische discriminatie op de arbeidsmarkt in het Brussels  
Hoofdstedelijk Gewest. Onderzoek in het kader van het Sociaal Pact voor de  
Werkgelegenheid van de Brusselaars. Syntheserapport, ULB/KUL, BGDA.  
S’Jegers, Sara (in print - 2006). Een feminisme voor alle vrouwen? De witte 
vrouwenbeweging in Vlaanderen in relatie tot multiculturaliteit, ‘allochtone’ 
vrouwen(organisaties) en het hoofddoekendebat. In S. Debunne & S. S’Jegers (Red.) 
Genderstudies: een genre apart? Akten van het colloquium. Brussel: Sophia, 
coördinatienetwerk voor vrouwenstudies.  
Stevaert, S. (2005). De tolerantie voorbij. In: S. Stevaert, J. De Zutter, S. Nimmegeers & H. 
Vanheeswijck (Red.) Andersgeloof. Naar een actief pluralisme in Vlaanderen. (pp. 8-19) 
Leuven: Davidsfonds. 
Timmerman, C. (2003). Migratie en etnische minderheden in België. Cultuurrelativisme of 
fictie? Antwerpen/Apeldoorn: Garant.  
Van der Heyden, K., Geets, J. & Vanderwaeren, E. (2005). Islambeleving bij hoogopgeleide 
moslimjongeren in Vlaanderen. Gelijke kansen vanuit een moslimperspectief. Steunpunt 
Gelijkekansenbeleid, Consortium Universiteit Antwerpen en Universiteit Hasselt.  
Vanderwaeren, E. (2005), Wat heet gelijkheid van vrouwen en mannen in islam? PSW-
papers, Universiteit Antwerpen, 2005:2.  
Vrouwen Overleg Komitee (2005). Een feministische kijk op multiculturaliteit. Brochure. 
Brussel: Vrouwen Overleg Komitee. 
 20
Wekker, G. (2002). Nesten bouwen op een winderige plek. Denken over gender en etniciteit in 
Nederland. Universiteit van Utrecht. 
X. (2005). Intrafamiliaal Geweld. Naar een meer samenhangende aanpak, Berchem 
Steunpunt Algemeen Welzijnswerk vzw: 68. 
 
 
 
 
